

Message Text

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FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2238
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INFO USMISSION NATO
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 MBFR VIENNA 0354

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PARM, NATO
SUBJ: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: JUNE 30 EASTERN PLENARY STATEMENT

AT THE 142ND PLENARY MEETING OF THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS, HELD
JUNE 30 UNDER HIS CHAIRMANSHIP, POLISH REP (DABROWA)
DELIVERED THE ONLY STATEMENT. IT INCLUDED THE FIRST PLENARY
REFERENCE TO THE POSSIBILITY, MENTIONED INTERMITTENTLY BY EASTERN
REPS BILATERALLY IN THE PAST, OF FINDING A COMPROMISE TO COLLECTIVE
CEILINGS AS A MEANS OF ENSURING ADEQUATE FREEDOM TO MAINTAIN
POST-REDUCTION FORCE LEVELS. DABROWA DID NOT MAKE ANY SPECIFIC
SUGGESTIONS IN THIS REGARD. THE BULK OF HIS PRESENTATION MADE
THE CASE IN DETAIL FOR ADOPTION OF THE EASTERN FREEZE PROPOSAL
BASED ON OFFICIAL EASTERN AND WESTERN DATA WHICH POINTED TO THE
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EXISTENCE OF APPROXIMATE PARITY BETWEEN NATO AND WARSAW PACT
MILITARY MANPOWER IN THE REDUCTION AREA. THE FULL TEXT OF
THE RELATIVELY BRIEF POLISH STATEMENT FOLLOWS BELOW. END SUMMARY.

BEGIN TEXT:

FOUR YEARS AFTER THE ADOPTION ON JUNE 28, 1973, OF THE FINAL

COMMUNIQUE OF THE PREPARATORY CONSULTATIONS WE REALIZE, IN ALL SERIOUSNESS, THAT SO FAR IT IS THE ONLY FORMAL UNDERSTANDING IN THE COURSE OF A LONG PERIOD OF NEGOTIATIONS ON THE MUTUAL REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS AND ASSOCIATED MEASURES IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

THIS IMPORTANT DOCUMENT REMAINS A LASTING POINT OF DEPARTURE IN ANY ANALYSIS OF SUBMITTED PROPOSALS. UNQUESTIONABLY, THE PRINCIPLES IT INCORPORATES SHOULD FORM THE COMMON GROUND FOR AN EXPECTED REDUCTION AGREEMENT, WHILE ATTEMPTS TO CONTEST THESE PRINCIPLES CARRY US AWAY FROM THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THE MUTUALLY DETERMINED GOAL.

THE ATTITUDE OF THE SOCIALIST STATES, IN ALL THE FACETS, CONFORMS WITH THE AGREED PRINCIPLES. EACH OF OUR PROPOSALS REMAINS TRUE TO THEM. THIS IS THE CASE BOTH WITH REGARD TO THE ORIGINAL DRAFT AGREEMENT SUBMITTED IN 1973, AS WELL AS OUR FEBRUARY 19, 1976, OFFER. THE LATTER PROPOSAL SHOULD BE DULY APPRECIATED BY THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, AND SHOULD CONSTITUTE A BASIS FOR FUTURE SOLUTIONS. WE ARE STILL AWAITING A CONSTRUCTIVE RESPONSE TO THIS PROPOSAL.

AS THE STATE OF THESE TALKS DEMONSTRATES, THE WESTERN DELEGATIONS CONTINUE TO BUILD THEIR NEGOTIATING PLATFORM ON THE UNJUST ASSUMPTIONS AIMED AT OBTAINING UNILATERAL MILITARY ADVANTAGES BY THE NATO STATES, FOREMOSTLY THROUGH THE ASYMMETRICAL

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REDUCTIONS AND THE SO-CALLED COLLECTIVE CEILINGS AFTER REDUCTION, AT THE EXPENSE OF BASIC SECURITY INTERESTS OF THE SOCIALIST STATES, INCLUDING POLAND.

WE BELIEVE THAT THE COURSE OF FURTHER DISCUSSION WILL CERTIFY TO THE FAULTINESS OF THE CONCEPT OF COLLECTIVE CEILINGS, AS WELL AS THE UNREALISTIC NATURE OF THE WESTERN DEMANDS TO ESTABLISH INDIVIDUAL CEILINGS ON THE USSR AND THE US FORCES IN THE AREA ALONE, WHILE WELL OVER 2/3 OF THE NATO STATES MILITARY PERSONNEL WOULD BE LEFT OUTSIDE THE FRAMEWORK OF SUCH LIMITATIONS.

IN CONNECTION WITH THE DISCUSSION ON THE NATURE OF THE POST-REDUCTION LIMITATIONS, AND REFERRING TO THE STATEMENT BY THE DISTINGUISHED REPRESENTATIVE OF CANADA ON JUNE 10, 1977, WE WOULD LIKE TO STRESS OUR CONVICTION THAT IT IS WELL POSSIBLE TO FIND COMPROMISE SOLUTIONS - WITHOUT RESORTING TO THE IDEA OF COLLECTIVE CEILINGS - FOR A SITUATION, WHEN ANY OF THE PARTIES UNDERTAKE A FUTURE UNILATERAL REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES. NATURALLY, WE HAVE IN MIND SOLUTIONS WHICH, BY PRESERVING THE FORCE EQUILIBRIUM IN THE AREA, WOULD NOT INFRINGE UPON THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF THE PARTIES TO THE AGREEMENT.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 3 MBFR VIENNA 0354

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

IF ONE STRIVES FOR PROGRESS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, THEN
ONE CANNOT ATTEMPT TO FORCE UPON THE WARSAW TREATY STATES
SOLUTIONS CONTRADICTORY TO THE AGREED PRINCIPLES OF MUTUALITY
AND EQUITY OF REDUCTIONS, AND UNDIMINISHED SECURITY OF THE
PARTIES. ONE CANNOT DEMAND THAT THE SOCIALIST STATES UNDERTAKE
COMMITMENTS WHICH THE WESTERN STATES THEMSELVES ARE NOT READY
TO UNDERTAKE. ONE CANNOT HOPE TO NULLIFY, THROUGH THESE
NEGOTIATIONS, THE LIMITATIONS AND RIGOURS IN THE SPHERE OF
NATIONAL ARMAMENTS IN EUROPE THAT FOLLOW FROM THE PREVIOUS
INTERNATIONAL TREATIES. THE MAXIM: "ALL OR NOTHING", WHICH
THE WESTERN DELEGATIONS SEEM TO PLACE IN THE GROUNDWORK OF
THEIR ACTIVITY IN VIENNA, DOES NOT PROMISE PROGRESS.

IN THE INTERESTS OF ENSURING PROGRESS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS,
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THE SOVIET UNION, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC AND POLAND TABLED ON DECEMBER 5, 1974, IN THE STATEMENT BY THE DISTINGUISHED REPRESENTATIVE OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, A DRAFT OF A JOINT DECLARATION OF THE ELEVEN STATES-DIRECT PARTICIPANTS ON A COMMITMENT FOR NON-INCREASE IN THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THEIR ARMED FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE FOR THE DURATION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS.

IN THE STATEMENT BY THE DISTINGUISHED REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SOVIET UNION ON MARCH 17, 1977, THE DELEGATIONS OF THE SOCIALIST STATES RENEWED THE PROPOSAL CONCERNING THE JOINT DECLARATION. THIS TOOK PLACE IN THE NEW SITUATION, WHEN BOTH THE WARSAW TREATY STATES/ IN JUNE, 1976/, AS WELL AS THE NATO STATES /IN DECEMBER, 1976/ TABLED OFFICIAL DATA ON THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THEIR ARMED FORCES, INCLUDING GROUND FORCES, IN THE AGREED AREA OF CENTRAL EUROPE, AS ON JANUARY 1, 1976.

THE COMMITMENT ON THE NON-INCREASE OF THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE NATO AND THE WARSAW TREATY DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN THE AREA WOULD HAVE GREAT POLITICAL, MILITARY AND PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPORTANCE.

IN THE LIGHT OF THE DECLARATIONS BY THE PARTIES THAT THEY DID NOT INCREASE THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THEIR ARMED FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE OVER A NUMBER OF YEARS, THIS SEEMS A RELATIVELY SIMPLE STEP. IT WOULD REPRESENT A PRACTICAL SIGN OF PROGRESS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. THIS ACT WOULD SUBSTANTIATE OUR WILL TO STRIVE FOR AN AGREEMENT, SIMILARLY AS IT WAS DONE BY ADOPTING THE AGREED PRINCIPLES OF THE NEGOTIATIONS IN 1973.

THE ESSENCE OF THE "FREEZE" COMMITMENT, WHICH WE PROPOSE, LIES IN THE FACT THAT IT WOULD RESULT IN A FIXATION, STARTING WITH A DEFINITE DATE - THIS BEING THE DATE OF THE CONFIDENTIAL

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ACCORD, OR A LATER ONE - OF AN UPPER LEVEL OF THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE. NEITHER THE NATO STATES, NOR THE WARSAW TREATY STATES COULD EXCEED THAT LEVEL DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS.

THE SIMPLEST SOLUTION WOULD BE TO ESTABLISH SUCH LIMITES ACCORDING TO DATA OFFICIALLY TABLED BY THE PARTIES ON THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THEIR RESPECTIVE FORCES. AS IS KNOWN, THESE DATA POINT TO AN APPROXIMATE PARITY, REFLECTING THE REAL RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 3 OF 3 MBFR VIENNA 0354

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

WE ARE READY TO FOCUS EXCLUSIVELY ON THE "FREEZING" OF
PERSONNEL OF ARMED FORCES, ALTHOUGH THE SOCIALIST STATES STAND
ON THE NEED TO REDUCE ARMAMENTS IS WELL KNOWN. WE CONSIDER THE
"FREEZE" OF MANPOWER AS A SOLUTION LEADING TO SUBSEQUENT
REDUCTION COMMITMENTS THAT WILL COVER ALL MAJOR TYPES OF
ARMAMENTS IN THE AREA.

WE TREAT THE "FREEZE" PROPOSAL AS A TRANSITIONAL STEP, A
PARTIAL MEASURE, WHICH WILL BE LATER SUBSTITUTED BY A REDUCTION
AGREEMENT. IT IS NOT, THEREFORE, AS THE WESTERN DELEGATIONS
CLAIM, AN EFFORT TO CONTRACTUALIZE PRE-REDUCTION LEVELS, NOR
PREJUDICE THE OUTCOME OF THE NEGOTIATIONS.

THE SOCIALIST STATES CONTINUE TO BE INTERESTED IN SUBSTANTIAL
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MUTUAL REDUCTIONS OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL
EUROPE. WE ARE READY TO REAFFIRM THIS INTEREST FORMALLY, ON
THE BASIS OF MUTUALITY, ON THE OCCASION OF THE ADOPTION OF THE

"FREEZE" COMMITMENT.

WITH REGARD TO THE FORM OF THE "FREEZE" UNDERTAKING, THE SOCIALIST DELEGATIONS HAVE PROPOSED TO FORMULATE A DOCUMENT AS SIMPLE AS POSSIBLE: THE JOINT DECLARATION OF THE ELEVEN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS OF THE TALKS. BEARING IN MIND THE INTERIM NATURE OF THIS DOCUMENT, WE FEEL THAT IT COULD REMAIN IN THE GESTION OF THE EXECUTIVE AUTHORITIES, WITHOUT RATIFICATION REQUIREMENTS. WE ARE OPEN TO ANY SUGGESTIONS OF THE WESTERN DELEGATIONS AS TO A FORMAL FRAME OF THE PROPOSED ACCORD.

THE EUROPEAN SITUATION AND THE STATE OF THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS DICTATE THE NECESSITY OF SUCH A CONCRETE STEP. THE EXPERIENCE OF OTHER DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS DEMONSTRATES THE POSITIVE MEANING OF PARTIAL AND INTERIM MEASURES FOR THE REACHING OF MORE COMPLEX AND DURABLE AGREEMENTS.

THE PROPOSAL OF THE SOCIALIST STATES ALSO TAKES INTO ACCOUNT THAT THE "FREEZE" IDEA HAS FOUND ITS REFLECTION IN THE INITIATIVES PUT FORWARD IN THE COURSE OF OUR TALKS, INCLUDING THE WESTERN STATES' PLAN OF DEC 16, 1975, AND THE SOCIALIST STATES' PLAN OF FEB 19, 1976. THE INCORPORATION OF THE "FREEZE" IDEA INTO THE GENERAL STANDS OF THE PARTIES IS NOT A COINCIDENCE. THEREFORE, IT CAN REPRESENT THE PROPER GROUND IN OUR SEARCH FOR AN AGREEMENT.

POLAND AND OTHER SOCIALIST STATES HAVE NOT, IN FACT, INCREASED THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THEIR ARMED FORCES, INCLUDING GROUND FORCES, IN THE AREA, FOR A NUMBER OF YEARS NOW. MOREOVER, WE HAVE ALSO VOICED OUR READINESS, AS DECLARED ON THE HIGHEST CONFIDENTIAL

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LEVEL, TO UNDERTAKE A PROPER FORMAL COMMITMENT ON A MUTUAL NON-INCREASE OF THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF ARMED FORCES IN THE AREA FOR THE DURATION OF THESE TALKS.

WE APPEAL TO OUR WESTERN PARTNERS TO DEMONSTRATE A SIMILAR READINESS. END TEXT.RESOR

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